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COMMENTS
THE IMPLICATIONS OF VACA v. SIPES ON EMPLOYEE
GRIEVANCE PROCESSING
When an employer wrongfully discharges an employee and the union will
not prosecute his grievance, what are the employee's remedies? Will he be
successful in a suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion? Does the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947' afford the employee
any relief in a suit against the employer?
The Supreme Court recently answered these questions in Vaca v. Sipes.2 A
discharged employee brought suit in a Missouri state court against his union
after the union refused to process his grievance through the last stage of the
grievance procedure. The union claimed that it had acted in good faith as it
considered the employee's claim to be without merit. The Supreme Court held
that the union had not breached its duty of fair representation even though a
jury had found that the grievance was in fact meritorious.
3
This comment will discuss the implications of the Vaca decision. The case
represents a significant statement of national labor policy, and it is an expres-
sion of the high court's position in the continuing controversy over the rights
of individual employees in a bargaining unit.4 The decision will undoubtedly
have the effect of strengthening union control over the individual employee. It
is submitted that as a result of the Vaca case in many instances a union's deci-
sion not to prosecute an individual's grievance will have the practical effect of
stranding that individual with no judicial remedy. He will be unable to recover
in suits against either the employer or the union.
The Vaca case also involves a jurisdictional question. This aspect of the
decision is beyond the purview of this paper and will be considered only to the
extent that it is necessary to an understanding of the broad implications of the
case.
To fully grasp the impact of the Vaca decision it is necessary first to con-
sider two related topics: the role of grievance procedures in contemporary labor
relations and the duty of fair representation.
1. The Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964). [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
2. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
3. Id. at 194-95.
4. The term bargaining unit has been defined as:
not a union; it is a group of jobs. It may be the jobs connected with a particular
machine or operation; it may be the jobs of a particular craft, such as painters;
it may be the jobs in a particular department of a plant; it may be clerical jobs
or production jobs; it may be all nonsupervisory jobs in a given plant or in all
the plants of the employer.
Labor Law Group Trust, Labor Relations and the Law 59 n.2 (3d ed. 1965). LMRA § 9(a),
61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964) provides that the union selected by a
majority of the employees in a bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative for all




A basic distinction should be made between complaints and grievances.
A complaint has been defined as "any behavior of the employer that an em-
ployee or the union does not like (what he has done or what he has failed to
do) . . ."5 An employee may present a complaint to his union or to the fore-
man, but unless the complaint comes within the definition of a grievance, the
collective bargaining agreement between the union and management will afford
him no means of obtaining relief. A grievance "is a charge that the union-
management contract has been violated."6 It should be clear that some, but
not all, complaints may be grievances. Grievances almost always take the form
of a charge made by either an individual employee, a group of employees, or
the union accusing the employer of a contract violation. In a rare case, manage-
ment may assert a grievance against an employee or the union.
7
Grievance procedures are created by contract and therefore may vary in
form according to the intent of the parties-the union and the employer. 8
Yet, most collective bargaining agreements describe a basic successive step
procedure. The mechanics of the typical procedure are straightforward: 9 an
employee with a problem consults the union steward who will present it to
the foreman on the employee's behalf. If no solution is worked out at this level
the grievance is submitted in written form to the chief steward. He will discuss
the matter with the superintendant of the grievant's department. If the matter
remains unsolved at this second level it may be forwarded to the union griev-
ance committee. The committee will represent the employee in a conference
with the plant's industrial relations department. If agreement has still not been
reached, then the matter will be submitted to arbitration.' 0
5. S. Slichter, J. Healy & E. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Management 694 (1960).
6. Id.
7. Slichter attributes this rareness to the fact that management can proceed with its
own interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
8. See J. Kuhn, Bargaining In Grievance Settlement 5-21 (1961) for descriptions of
the various forms which grievance procedures may take.
9. Kuhn warns that although seemingly simple, most grievance procedures "are more
complicated than a casual reading might suggest, for the written procedure hardly hints
at the involved and intricate practice." Id. at 6. See L. Sayles & G. Strauss, The Local
Union 14-15 (rev. ed. 1967) for a graphic presentation of the steps involved in typical
grievance processing.
10. Arbitration has been described as follows:
today, because of necessity and convenience, labor and management have by
agreement established a procedure for settling disputes which includes their own
forum and their own private judges, or arbitrators .... The parties select the ar-
bitrator by agreement, or accept one appointed by some agreed-upon third party.
... In the broadest sense, what both parties want from their private judge is a fair
and practical decision. . . . His authority comes from the collective bargaining
agreement, plus the submission or stipulation, if there is one .... It is not uncommon
to make a record of the hearing in cases of importance. In many disputes the parties
file briefs after the hearing. . . . [The arbitrator] usually writes an opinion to
accompany his award. . . .An arbitration award is not merely the settlement of a
dispute. Often it forms a rule or interpretation for the parties' future conduct, and
they must live with it.
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Grievances may be categorized into five principle classifications. 1 First,
many grievances arise out of clear-cut contract violations by the employer.
Second, a grievance may involve a question of fact only, e.g., was Smith late
for work? Third, a grievance may turn upon contract interpretation. This is
especially common where the collective bargaining agreement contains vague
and indefinite clauses. Fourth, grievances often arise on strictly procedural
grounds. For example, was the union-management contract to be administered
in a particular manner? Fifth, the reasonableness of an employer's course of
action is frequently the subject of a grievance charge.
As the union-management relationship changes, the number of grievances
pressed will vary.12 During an organizational period, when a union is first seek-
ing to gain recognition in a plant, an atmosphere of aggression towards manage-
ment is often created. After the first union-management contract is signed
the union frequently continues to foster hostility towards the employer. Dur-
ing this period most company decisions are actively protested by the union.
The theory behind this forced antagonistic behavior has been explained as an
effort on the part of union leadership to demonstrate its eagerness to actively
represent the rank and file.' 3 Not only do the union leaders foment grievances,
but individual employees will also press claims to alert both union and manage-
ment to unacceptable clauses in the contract.' 4 Soon the need for harmonious
union-management relations is realized, 15 leading to industrial peace. The
parties appreciate the fact that mutual destruction will benefit neither side. It
is at this point that a stable relationship begins.
A settled pattern of grievance processing can then be noted.16 Union offi-
cers become selective, realizing the limitations of time and money. A definite
strategy is established. For instance, union leaders learn that certain grievances
will only antagonize management and management realizes that it must acqui-
esce in certain cases.
Grievance rates do not remain static. Union election campaigns often are
characterized by increased grievance activity. Furthermore, if new leaders are
elected, this surge may continue for some time.17 Another source of fluctuation
is the changing popularity of different employment or industrial problems within
the union.'8 The determinants of whether grievance rates are high or low have
been categorized by the following indicia: (1) "the state of relations between
Hepburn & Loiseaux, The Nature of the Arbitration Process, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 657, 660-63
(1957).
11. See S. Slichter, J. Healy & E. Livernash, supra note 5, at 694-96 for a thorough
discussion of these categories.
12. See L. Sayles & G. Strauss, supra note 9, at 7-13.
13. Id. at 8.
14. S. Slichter, J. Healy & E. Livernash, supra note 5, at 699.
15. L. Sayles & G. Strauss, supra note 9, at 9, trace the survival goal to E. Bakke,
Mutual Survival: The Goal of Union and Management (1946).
16. Id. at 8-10.
V. See S. Slichter, 1. Healy & E, Livernash, supra note 5, at 699.
18. Id.
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the union and the employer," (2) the degree of experience of the union and
the employer, (3) "personalities of management and local union officials,"
(4) "methods of plant operation," (5) "changes in operating methods or con-
ditions," (6) "union politics," and (7) "management policies."' 9
Grievances serve more than just a negative function. Not only is a griev-
ance the means by which an employee can complain about employment con-
ditions, but, through creative grievance processing, the union is able to establish
specific definitions for ambiguous contract terms.
20
A major problem in this area and the subject of this comment is the union's
discretion in processing grievances. An individual employee can promote his
grievance within the union,2 1 yet at each stage in the processing of his griev-
ance the union may unilaterally terminate its efforts on his behalf.
There are a number of factors which influence union leadership in decid-
ing which grievances to pursue. A union officer's choice will have political
ramifications within the union.22 He must consider the interests of the various
groups within the union to be sure that he is not weakening the bargaining
position of the majority for the sake of a few. Union leaders clearly "trade off"
the interests of one group against another within the union.23a As Professor
Blumrosen has aptly pointed out:
On many matters the union hierarchy may be forced to choose between
competing claims of different union subgroups, for the union consists of
men with disparate interests; differences in age, health, marital status,
aspirations, skills, and departmental outlook mark the union membership.
2
4
At the same time, it has often been shown that union officers prefer some griev-
ances on the basis of personal favoritism rather than on the merits of the
claim.2 5 Another factor influencing the union's choice will be the maintenance
of good relations with management. 26 The union hierarchy will usually be
careful not to push petty grievances which might antagonize management. The
union may not only seek to prevent a clogging of the grievance machinery,
but may wish to pursue only those claims which are of precedent value. An
additional consideration is the amount of rank and file support that can be
mustered to back up the claim 27 for it may be difficult to settle the grievance
successfully unless management appreciates the gravity of the claim. Perhaps
19. Id. at 701-20 for a thorough discussion of these indicia.
20. For an analysis of the effect of grievance procedures on collective bargaining, see
generally Ryder, Some Concepts Concerning Grievance Procedure, 7 Lab. L.J. 15 (1956).
21. L. Sayles & G. Strauss, supra note 9, at 35. Sayles and Strauss suggest "button-
holing" officers, voting for those men likely to favor the grievant's cause, and more primitive
techniques such as slowdowns and wildcat strikes.
22. Id. at 41.
23. Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 574, 144 A.2d 88,
98 (1958).
24. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Juldicial
Control of The Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435, 65 (1963).
25. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Dade Bros., 18 N.J. 457, 114 A.2d 266 (1953).
26. L. Sayles & G. Strauss, supra note 9, 41-42.
27. Id. at 42-43.
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the most common reason offered by unions for refusing to process an indivi-
dual's grievance is its lack of merit.
28
Grievance procedures are established and defined in union-management
contracts. The individual employee's right to pursue his grievances are there-
fore limited by the terms of that contract.2 9 Since the typical collective bar-
gaining agreement provides that the power to press grievances rests solely with
the union,30 the employee must seek relief outside of the contract if the union
fails to entertain his claim. For example, he may elect to sue the union for
breach of its duty of fair representation.
3 1
II. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The principle that a labor organization has a duty to represent fairly all
the individuals in a bargaining unit, whether members of the union or not, was
first enunciated in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.3 2 Under the author-
ity of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 a the defendant union, the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, had been recognized as the exclusive
bargaining representative of a craft of railway employees-the firemen em-
ployed by the Railroad Company. The majority of the firemen were white and
were members of the Brotherhood. Negro firemen had always been excluded
from membership because of a restrictive clause in the constitution of the
Brotherhood. The difficulty arose when the Brotherhood, without giving the
Negro firemen a hearing, amended the collective bargaining agreement with
the Railroad. The new, agreement provided, in effect, for the gradual phasing
out of the Negroes from employment as firemen. Plaintiff, a Negro fireman,
brought suit against both the employer and the Brotherhood to enjoin en-
forcement of the agreement.3 4 The Alabama Circuit Court dismissed the suit
28. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
29. It has frequently been argued that the individual can present his grievance directly
to the employer in disregard of his union under the proviso to LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat.
143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). See infra Part III(A), pp. 172-74, and the Supreme
Court's recent ruling on the matter, infra Part IV(A), pp. 176-78.
30. See, e.g., Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
31. The employee might also bring a § 301 suit against the employer for breach of
the collective bargaining contract. LMRA § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1964). Under the exhaustion of contractual remedies doctrine though, he will still have
to prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation. See infra Part IV(C),
pp. 180-82. He might also charge the union with an unfair labor practice in a proceeding
before the NLRB. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 150 N.L.R.B.
312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (Breach of the duty of fair representation
held an unfair labor practice.). In proving the unfair labor practice the employee would
undoubtedly be held to the same standard of "fairness" as in a court suit against the union
for breach of its duty.
32. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). On the duty of fair representation, see generally, Cox, The
Dity of Fair Representation, 2 Viii. L. Rev. 151 (1957); Hanslowe, Individual Rights in
Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959).
33. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 54 Stat. 785 (1940), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
34. Plaintiff also sought to enjoin the Brotherhood from acting as his exclusive repre-
sentative, and to recover damages.
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for failure to state a cause of action and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.85
The United States Supreme Court 6 reversed this judgment, stating:
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent
non-union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not discrimina-
ting against them as such in the contracts which it makes as their repre-
sentative, the minority would be left with no means of protecting their
interests or, indeed, their right to earn a livelihood by pursuing the occu-
pation in which they are employed.3 7
Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act, had expressly authorized the
majority of a craft to choose an exclusive bargaining representative for the
entire unit.38 The court concluded that it could therefore be inferred from the
Act that the union had a duty to represent fairly all employees in the craft.30
The duty of fair representation was thus considered to have been derived
from the statute. It has since been extended to unions certified under section
9 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.40
In Miranda Fuel Co. v. NLRB,41 the National Labor Relations Board
for the first time held that a union's violation of its duty of fair representation
was an unfair labor practice.42 Although denied enforcement by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,43 this doctrine was again espoused by the board
in another case, Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB. 44 In this case the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit enforced the board's decision 45 and indicated
that the Miranda Fuel doctrine would preempt breach of fair representation
cases from the courts in accordance with the jurisdictional rule established in
35. 245 Ala. 113, 16 So.2d 416 (1944).
36. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
37. Id. at 201.
38. Railway Labor Act, § 2, Fourth, 44 Stat. 578 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
39. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-203.
40. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l
Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). LMRA
§ 9(c), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964), provides for elections to be con-
ducted by the NLRB whereby the employees in a bargaining unit elect a union to represent
them for bargaining purposes and the NLRB will certify the results of that election.
41. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
42. The NLRB held that breach of the duty of fair representation violated LMRA
§ 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964), and LMRA § 8(b) (2)1
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 8(b) (2) (1964). The LMRA forbids two types of unfair
labor practices, i.e., violations by the employer and violations by the union. Examples of
employer unfair labor practices are discrimination against employees because of union
activity, and refusal to bargain with the authorized bargaining representative of his em-
ployees. LMRA §§ 8(a)(3), (5), 61 Stat. 140, 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (5)
(1964). Examples of union unfair labor practices are refusal to bargain collectively with the
employer and, in certain situations, the imposition of excessive initiation fees. LMRA
§§ 8(b)(3), (5), 61 Stat. 141, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(3), (5) (1964). A charge
may be brought before the NLRB that an employer or a union is engaged in an unfair
labor practice. If after a hearing the NLRB finds that there has been a violation, it may
issue a cease and desist order or take appropriate affirmative action.
43. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
44. 150 N.L.RB. 312 (1964).
45. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
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San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.4' In Vaca v. Sipes47 the
Supreme Court disagrees with the Fifth Circuit and concludes that the Garmon
preemption doctrine is inapplicable. As a result, fair representation cases may
now be brought before either the courts or the National Labor Relations Board.
The duty of fair representation was a judicial creation48 and its develop-
ment for the most part has been left to the courts. The trend, as evidenced by
the case law, has been to protect the unions in their discretionary decisions
as to which grievances are worthy of processing.49 The courts have facilitated
this policy in a few instances by imposing strict procedural requirements on
the individual employee seeking redress in court.50
A more effective means of strengthening union control of grievance pro-
cedures at the expense of individual employee rights has been to impose a liber-
al standard of fairness on the union. The duty of fair representation, as de-
fined in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,51 required the union "to repre-
sent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile dis-
crimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." This standard, labeled the
good faith test, has been almost uniformly followed by the courts.5 2 It means,
in essence, that if the union can show that it refused to process a grievance in
good faith, then its duty of fair representation has not been breached. The
Supreme Court has also indicated that another consideration in meeting the
requirements of the fairness test dictates that unions act in a non-arbitrary
fashion.5 3 That is, the union, in representing individual employees within the
bargaining unit, must "avoid arbitrary conduct."
54
A possible variation of the standard of fairness required in breach of duty
cases may be traced to a portion of the Supreme Court's decision in Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffiman.5 5 In that case, complainant alleged that a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer violated
46. 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The Supreme Court established the basic policy that
"when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [LMRA], the States as well
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted."
47. 386 U.S. 171, 188 (1967).
48. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
49. See Blumrosen, supra note 24, at 1470-71. He argues that "the lower federal courts
and state courts have not willingly protected individual rights under the duty of fair
representation."
50. See, e.g., Colbert v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1953)
(Strict pleading requirement-complaint failed to set forth a claim upon which relief
could be granted.); Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 NJ. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952) (Since a
union is an unincorporated association and inseparable from its individual members, there-
fore it cannot be sued by a member.), overruled by Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J.
61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
51. 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
52. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964); Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959); Falsetti
v. Local 2026, IJMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
53. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 342.
54. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177.
55. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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his rights.56 The Supreme Court held that the contract provision was valid
and that the union had not breached its duty of fair representation. In arriv-
ing at this decision, the Court made the observation that the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement were "within reasonable bounds of relevancy."57
This phrase could arguably be interpreted to have added another element
to the standards which must be considered in defining the duty of fair repre-
sentation.
58
The duty of fair representation is a significant but sometimes powerless
defensive weapon in the arsenal of the employee. He is in need of protection
because of the combative stance which unions have been forced to adopt, as a
labor organization must often ignore an individual's grievances when these
conflict with the bargaining aims of the unit. It has become apparent that the
duty of fair representation will often provide scant relief to individual griev-
ants in such situations. As indicated above, the courts have sacrificed indivi-
dual rights and have struck the balance in favor of unions. 0 This trend has
given rise to a heated debate among commentators, which Vaca v. Sipes 0 has
settled.
III. THEs DEBATE
A. The Individual May Take His Grievance Directly To The
Employer: Section 9(a) Proviso
The proviso to section 9(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
states that:
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining rep-
resentative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, that the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.0 '
The procedure contemplated in the proviso to section 9(a) is basic: 02 the
individual has a choice. He may submit his grievance to the union for pre-
sentation or he may submit his grievance directly to the employer and person-
56. In determining seniority the contract gave credit not only for post-employment
military service, but also for pre-employment service. Complainant argued that this was
"unfair" because in some instances men had been in the employment of Ford for a
shorter period of time, yet had more seniority due to their pre-employment service.
57. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 342.
58. The Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), has added an additional
variation to the definition of fairness. See infra Part IV(B), pp. 178-79.
59. See infra Part IV, pp. 176-82, for a discussion of the Supreme Court's recent state-
ment in Vaca that union discretion is necessary to the national policy of collective bargain-
ing.
60. 386 U.S. at 191.
61. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
62. For a description of this procedure see Report of Committee on Improvement of
Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 143, 174 (1955).
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ally process it through settlement. If the second method is chosen, however,
the union must be notified so that its representative may be present when the
parties come to terms.
Although the section 9(a) proviso is an explicit statutory directive, many
courts have deprived individuals of any independant right of access to the
employer.6 3 Yet, other courts have granted individual employees the right to
process their own grievances.64
A problem arises in that grievance procedures are considered to be crea-
tures of contract. The employer and the union, in most collective bargaining
contracts, agree that grievances may be processed only through the grievance
procedures established in the contract. These procedures normally vest in the
union exclusive authority to process grievances. Furthermore, many union
constitutions have clauses granting the union the exclusive right to negotiate
grievances on behalf of the members.05
A considerable number of academicians have advanced the thesis that the
section 9(a) proviso grants every individual employee the absolute right to
have his grievance processed. 6 The argument has been succinctly stated in
the following terms: "the individual grievance should be recognized as an
affirmative right. If the employer has agreed to discuss with the union certain
grievances in a certain manner, he should be obligated to give equal recogni-
tion to an individual grievance."
67
The proponents of this proposition base their argument on a concept of
strong individual rights in labor-management relations.68 As Professor Summers
points out, many grievances involve basic job rights with loss of seniority or
discharge at stake.69 "Making the union the exclusive representative for pro-
cessing grievances subordinates those interests of individual employees and
endangers interests which collective bargaining purposes to protect." 70 Further-
63. See, e.g., Broniman v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1965);
Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir.
1962); Ostrofsky v. United Steel Workers, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
849 (1960); Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
64. See, e.g., West Texas Util. Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 855 (1953); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 NJ. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963);
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
962 (1960).
65. See Committee Report, supra note 62, at 152.
66. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Manage-
ment Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631 (1959); Murphy,
The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. Rev. 373 (1965); Rosen,
The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem, 24
Md. L. Rev. 233 (1964); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitra-
tion, 37 N.Y.U.JL. Rev. 362 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility In a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327 (1958).
67. Committee Report, supra note 62, at 188.
68. See Wyle, Labor Arbitration and the Concept of Exclusive Representation, 7 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 783, 785 (1966). Wyle, an opponent of this position, makes the
criticism that few of these academicians have had any "practical experience in collective-
bargaining."
69. Summers, supra note 66, at 392.
70. Id.
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more, this position is bolstered by the obvious "opportunities for subtle dis-
criminations" which exist when the union is permitted full control over the
prosecution of grievances. 7' For example, the grievances of loyal union mem-
bers might receive more favorable treatment by the union than those claimed
by non-members, or by those "who opposed the business agent in the last
election .... -72
The thesis that the individual may take his grievance directly to the em-
ployer finds primary support in the words of the section 9(a) proviso. Pro-
fessor Summers has analyzed its legislative history, 73 noting that the proviso
was first embodied in the original Wagner Act, but in less explicit form.74 Two
early cases,7 5 which construed the original proviso and were instrumental in
framing the 1947 amendments to section 9(a), 76 indicated that the individual
had the right to process his claim without regard to union interference. A study
of the committee reports and legislative debates concerning the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 leads Summers to the conclusion that Congress re-
wrote the proviso with those cases in mind. 77 Furthermore, Summers contends,
the principle intent of the legislators "was to protect the individual employee
from being wholly submerged by the collective bargaining structures.178
B. The Union Should Have Exclusive Power To Prosecute Grievances
Many federal and state courts have held that the individual employee
cannot compel the employer to entertain his grievance.70 These courts have
construed the section 9(a) proviso as giving the employer the right to consider
the grievances of the individual employee, rather than the duty.80 The Supreme
Court made a cryptic reference to this question of individual rights in Republic
Steel v. Maddox,81 but did not pause to offer a conclusion.8 2 However, many
commentators have taken a position,83 arguing that national policy requires
that labor organizations have exclusive power to prosecute grievances.
71. Cox, Rights Under A Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 630 (1956). Although
an opponent of the LMRA § 9(a) proviso provision, Cox recognized the risks of his own
position. See infra Part Ill(B), pp. 174-76.
72. Id.
73. Summers, supra note 66, at 380-84.
74. The National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-67 (1964). The original proviso read: "That any individual employee or group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer."
75. Matter of Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), enforced as modified, 147 F.2d
69 (Sth Cir. 1945); Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on
rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
76. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
77. Summers, supra note 66, at 383-84.
78. Id. at 384.
79. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 63.
80. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 185 (2d
Cir. 1962).
81. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
82. Id. at 652. "If the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the
individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of redress then available."
83. See generally Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956);
Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959);
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The thesis that the proviso to section 9(a) entitles the individual em-
ployee to take his grievance directly to the employer in disregard of his union,
has been criticized as a "retrogressive approach to labor relations." 84 That is,
the individual rights thesis represents
a return to the arithmetical notion of equality, one man--one voice,
one employer-one employee, an 'equality' which has no basis in
social and economic reality. The argument is directed toward the abo-
lition of collective bargaining ... and a return to the inequities and
social costs of the individual employment agreement.8 5
Professor Cox has pointed out several weaknesses in the individual rights
approach.8 6 He contends that it ignores orthodox collective bargaining pro-
cedures and would lead to a subordination of group interests. A further criti-
cism is that the section 9(a) proviso is devoid of any enforcement sanctionssT
Cox also argues that to construe the section 9(a) proviso in such a manner
would be to disregard the clear implications of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act; the contention is that the statute clearly establishes the union as the
exclusive bargaining agent for the employees in a bargaining unit, where the
union has been selected by a majority of those employees.88
One rather speculative criticism of the individual rights theory is that it
might induce unions to bargain for clanses which reserve their right to strike
during the existence of the contract.8 9 The argument hinges on the assump-
tion that if the employer is forced to arbitrate individual grievances even
though they have been rejected by the union, then management will refuse to
include arbitration as a stage in grievance procedures. Since the quid pro quo
for arbitration is the union's pledge to refrain from striking during the term
of the contract,90 strike clauses must undoubtedly result.
A further criticism is that continual harassment of management by indi-
vidual grievants would undermine a good relationship with the employer.91
An employer who can rest assured that the union will filter out meritless
claims will probably be more receptive to the grievances which the union does
prosecute. Thus, if the union were given exclusive control over grievance pro-
cessing, more sanguine labor relations might result.
One other argument is that the goals of collective bargaining would be
Wyle, Labor Arbitration and The Concept of Exclusive Representation, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 783 (1966).
84. Wyle, supra note 83, at 785.
85. Id.
86. Cox, supra note 83, at 631.
87. Id. at 624. But see Summers' rebuttal, supra note 66, at 380.
88. Cox, supra note 83, at 631, citing LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1964), and LMRA § 8(a)(5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
Cox further argues, id. at 624, that the "office of a proviso is seldom to create substantive
rights and obligations; it carves exceptions out of what goes before."
89. Wyle, supra note 83, at 789.
90. Id., citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd,
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
91. Id. at 793.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
most effectively realized if the exclusive authority to prosecute grievances were
vested in the union.
A delicate balance exists between the rights of an individual member
of any group and the welfare of the majority of its members. Unions
strive to maintain this equilibrium in a complex situation .... [They]
must be prepared to engage in collective bargaining during the period
of a contract to seek changes in the agreement, when warranted by
changes in circumstances.92
The hypothesis supporting this position is that grievance settlements are a form
of collective bargaining because they often redefine the terms and conditions of
employment.9 3 If the union had exclusive authority and then exercised its dis-
cretion and processed only those grievances furthering group interests, the labor
organization would be properly functioning as bargaining representative for the
unit.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE Vaca CASE
A. Resolution Of The Debate
The United States Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes94 has resolved the
debate. After a cursory presentation of the opposing viewpoints,"5 Justice
White sets forth the Court's position:
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion,
we do not agree that the individual employee has an absolute right to
have his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of
the applicable collective bargaining agreement.9 6
In this one sentence the Court has silenced those who insist that the individual
employee may by-pass the union and present his grievance directly to manage-
ment. If the collective bargaining agreement vests exclusive control over griev-
ance processing with the labor organization, then the individual employee
must depend on the union to prosecute his claim. Of course, as the court indi-
cates, the union is still subject to the overriding restraints of the duty of fair
representation.
9 7
The implication of the passage quoted above is that the proviso to section
9(a) does not give the individual employee the absolute right to present his
grievance directly to the employer. It may be argued that the position of the
Court indicates an intention only to preclude arbitration by an individual em-
ployee. Thus, the individual grievant may take his claim directly to the employ-
er, but he cannot compel arbitration of that claim. If this were the Court's
92. Id. at 790.
93. Cf. Black-Clawson Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
94. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
95. Id. at 190.
96. Id. at 191.
97. Id., "we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritori-
ous grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion . . . ." See also id. at 193.
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position, it would certainly be a myopic approach. It would surely be a futile
gesture to permit the employee to process his own grievance but to deny him
recourse to the most important stage in the procedure-arbitration. It is more
likely that the Court went further. The intent was undoubtedly to isolate the
employer from direct approaches by the individual grievant.
The Court offers a number of arguments in support of its position.9
Section 203 (d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act is set forth99 as an
indication of national policy:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance dis-
putes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective bargaining agreement. 100
The Court then suggests that its approach ensures settlement of frivolous
grievances short of arbitration, consistency in grievance processing, and that
more intensive emphasis will be placed on major collective bargaining prob-
lems.10 1 An additional reason is that "the settlement process furthers the interest
of the union as statutory agent and as co-author of the bargaining agreement in
representing the employees in the enforcement 6f the agreement."'01 2 As a final
buttress for its position, the Court enumerates the deleterious consequences
which would follow if the individual employee could unilaterally invoke pro-
cessing of his grievance. It would undermine the settlement procedures set
forth in the collective bargaining agreement, destroy "the employer's confi-
dence in the union's authority and ... [relegate] the individual grievant to
the vagaries of independant and unsympathetic negotiation." The Court argues
further that it would "overburden arbitration processes and encourage deletion
of detailed grievance procedures in future contracts."'10 3
In announcing that unions are to be granted a broad discretion in select-
ing which grievances may be presented, the Supreme Court has cast new light
on national labor policy. Two stages in collective bargaining may be distin-
guished: negotiation and administration. The negotiation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement involves the adjustment of conflicts within the union so
that the generalized expectations of the employees might be incorporated into
the new contract. The administration of the agreement differs in that the indi-
vidual's claim is rooted in an existent union-management contract and broad
policy considerations might not be at stake.'0 4 Professor Blumrosen contends
that in the negotiation of a new contract "only the most important interests of
98. Id. at 191-92.
99. Id. at 191.
100. 61 Stat. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
101. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 191-92.
104. See Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435, 1476 (1963) for
a detailed outline of the differences.
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the employees are entitled to protection" whereas in the administration of a
contract "considerations relating to the stability of contractual rights dictate
that the balance be struck more favorably to the [individual]."'° By vesting
exclusive control over grievance processing with the union, the Supreme Court
has permitted administration and negotiation to be governed by the same
policies. That is, just as "politics" play a major role in the negotiation stage
of collective bargaining, this consideration will surely become decisive in the
administrative stage.' 0 6
It is interesting to note that the question whether an individual employee
has the absolute right to have his grievance processed might have been avoided
by the Court. In addition to a jurisdictional question, 0 7 the only issue proper-
ly before the Supreme Court was whether the Missouri Supreme Court'0 8 had
applied the correct standard in holding that the union had breached its duty of
fair representation.
B. Duty Of Fair Representation: A Revised Standard
The Vaca case originated as a duty of fair representation suit in the
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. Plaintiff, Benjamin Owens, a union
member, had been discharged from his employment at the Swift & Company
packing plant on the grounds of poor health. The company doctor had deter-
mined that Owens was not fit for heavy work because of high blood pressure.
The union filed a grievance with the company on Owens' behalf, after he as-
sured the union that his family physician had certified that his blood pressure
had been reduced. The collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration
as the last step in a five stage grievance procedure. After unsuccessful pros-
ecution of the grievance through the first four steps-Swift had persisted in
its assertion that Owens' blood pressure was dangerously high-the union sent
Owens to another doctor for an examination. The report indicated high blood
pressure and consequently the union refused to take Owens' grievance to arbi-
tration. Owens sued the union alleging that "he had been discharged from his
employment . .. in violation of the collective bargaining agreement then in
force... and that the union had 'arbitrarily, capriciously and without just or
reasonable reason or cause' refused to take his grievance with Swift to arbi-
tration.. . ."10 The jury returned a verdict for Owens, but the trial judge set
105. Id. For arguments contra, see Cox, satpra note 83, at 622, who suggests that the
union's duty is similar in both situations.
106. An example of a political consideration: a union refuses to prosecute an indi-
vidual's grievance concerning overtime pay due, because the union feels that repeated pestering
of management with petty grievances will foster antagonism. The union might prefer the
maintenance of amicable relations with management so that major grievances will be re-
ceived in a sympathetic atmosphere.
107. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the
Supreme Court's holding on the question of whether the courts are preempted from con-
sidering fair representation cases.
108. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965).
109. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 173.
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it aside and entered judgment for the union, deciding that the court had no
jurisdiction over the dispute.110 The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed.
On further appeal the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and ordered the jury's
verdict reinstated."1 Since the jury found that Owens had been wrongfully
discharged by Swift,"12 the court held that the union had breached its duty of
fair representation by refusing to process Owens' claim through the final stage
of the grievance procedure."i 3 Thus, the Missouri court determined that the
union was liable even though it had in good faith and non-arbitrarily decided
to terminate its efforts on Owens' behalf.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" i4 on both the juris-
dictional question-whether the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive
jurisdiction over breach of fair representation suits-and the question as to
whether the Missouri Supreme Court had applied the proper standard in hold-
ing the union liable. After deciding that the Missouri courts had jurisdiction
and that the preemption doctrine did not apply," 5 the Court turned to the
second issue. The Court declared that since the duty of fair representation was
derived from a federal statute,"16 a state court decision must be consistent with
federal law."17 In addition, a state court must apply federal standards when
determining whether the union breached its duty. The Supreme Court reversed
the Missouri high court holding that its finding of liability did not comport
with federal standards. It was held that since the union refused to process
Owens' grievance in good faith and non-arbitrarily, it had not breached its
duty of fair representation even though a jury later found the grievance to be
meritorious." 8 Thus, the Court introduced a new standard: "that a breach of
the duty of fair representation is not established merely by proof that the under-
lying grievance was meritorious .... 19
110. The court applied the Garmon preemption doctrine. See supra note 46.
111. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965).
112. Id. at 665. The Missouri Supreme Court indicated that the trial judge had in-
structed the jury that to hold the union liable one of the elements which must be found
was that Swift discharged Owens wrongfully. The court also indicated that the evidence
Owens presented at trial signified that he was fit for work and did not have high blood
pressure. The court concluded that the jury must have found that Owens was medically
fit and therefore wrongfully discharged by Swift.
113. Id.
114. Vaca v. Sipes, 384 U.S. 969 (1966).
115. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 176-88. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
116. Id. at 177, citing Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The Huffman
Court, 345 U.S. at 337, quoted LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1964) which authorizes a labor organization selected by a majority of employees in a
bargaining unit to be the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the
unit. The Huffman Court held that this statutory authority carries with it an obligation to
represent the members of the unit fairly.
117. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177.
118. Id. at 192-93.
119. Id. at 195.
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C. The Harsh Implications
The ramifications of the Vaca decision will undoubtedly produce harsh
practical consequences for the individual employee. In dissent, Justice Black
was critically aware of this. He remarked that the majority's decision "entirely
overlooks the interests of the injured employee, the only one who has anything
to lose.'
120
What are the avenues of relief available to an employee with a grievance
when his union refuses to process his claim through the grievance procedures
established in the collective bargaining agreement? If the union's constitution
or by-laws provide for internal appeal, he may seek relief in this direction.12'
However, what occurs if the union persists in its denial? As indicated above, 22
the Vaca Court has taken the position that unless the collective bargaining
agreement so provides, the individual may not compel processing of his griev-
ance by presenting his claim directly to management.' 2 3 The employee does
have recourse to the courts; he may sue the union for breach of its duty of
fair representation, 24 or he may sue the employer for breach of the collective
bargaining contract under section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act.125 Yet, as a result of the Vaca case, the individual grievant may neverthe-
less be left without a remedy.
In the fair representation suit against the union, claimant will be denied
relief so long as the union acted in good faith and non-arbitrarily. 20 Vaca v.
Sipes closes this door even further, for in this case the union's good faith con-
duct was absolved even though a jury had found the grievance to be meritori-
ous.127 Thus, under governing federal principles the union has not violated its
duty to an employee when it refuses in good faith to process an employee's
grievance. And under Vaca this remains true even though it is later determined
that the employee's grievance did in fact result from a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement by the employer.'
28
Furthermore, as a result of the Vaca decision, the employee will often lose
in his breach of contract suit against the employer. Established labor law
principles dictate that an employee must exhaust the grievance procedures
120. Id. at 209.
121. See generally Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-
Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. UL. Rev. 143, 156 (1955) for a discussion of the
problems inherent in the internal appeals approach.
122. See supra Part IV(A), pp. 176-78.
123. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191.
124. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
125. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
126. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 52.
127. 386 U.S. at 195.
128. Breach of the duty of fair representation is considered an unfair labor practice by
the NLRB. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. The NLRB will undoubtedly
adhere to the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Vaca. It therefore seems unlikely
that claimant in our example would be any more successful before the NLRB than le
would be in an unfair representation suit before a court.
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contained in the collective bargaining agreement before suing the employer
for breach of contract.129 At one point in the Vaca decision, the Court intro-
duces a rule which is an amplification of the exhaustion doctrine: an employee
can sue his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement "in
the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies,
provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached
its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance."' 130
This rule will eliminate section 301 (a) as a means of relief in many instances.
Under the Vaca rule claimant can only avoid the defense of failure to exhaust
contractual remedies by proving that he not only attempted to do so, but that
he was frustrated in his attempt by the union's bad faith conduct. If it is
shown that the union refused to process his grievance in good faith and non-
arbitrarily, then claimant's suit against the employer will result in dismissal.
The net result of the Vaca decision is that it may lead to grave con-
sequences for the individual employee. The problem will be most acute in situ-
ations where an employee's critical job interests are at stake. If an employee
is wrongfully discharged by the employer and if the union in good faith, non-
arbitrarily, and believing the claim to be without merit, refuses to process
the grievance, then the employee has lost his employment and may be without
judicial remedies.
131
An obvious way to avoid these perverse results would be to restrict the
union's freedom of action when presented with an employee's claim involving
critical job interests. That is, the union should be held to more than just the
good faith standard when it refuses to process an employee's grievance. This
has long been Professor Blumrosen's plan for the protection of critical job
interests.132 He maintains that:
The good faith discretion test does not adequately protect the em-
ployee's basic relation to his job. Discharge and seniority cases ...
should be heard on their merits in some impartial forum. The em-
ployee should be allowed to prove that his claim is meritorious. The
union would then be required to demonstrate why it rejected his
claim, in light of its decision to process other claims. This pattern of
proof might make the duty of fair representation more meaningful. 33
This plan would undoubtedly counter the harsh implications of the Vaca
decision. The union would not lightly refuse to prosecute an employee's griev-
129. See, e.g., Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Jenkins v. Win.
Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958); Rowan v. McKee, Inc.,
262 Minn. 366, 114 N.W.2d 692 (1962); Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 N.J. 541, 138
A.2d 24 (1958). Cf. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
130. 386 U.S. at 186.
131. The union in the Vaca case refused to process Owens? grievance because it con-
sidered his claim to be without merit. An unanswered question is whether the union has
breached its duty of fair representation if it already knows that the individual's grievance
is meritorious.
132. Blumrosen, supra note 104, at 1484-85.
133. Id. at 1485.
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ance. However, if this were the case, there would be an increased probability
that the union would be found to have breached its duty of fair representation.
Furthermore, the employee would not be prevented from suing the employer
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Claimant could oppose the
exhaustion defense because he could now show that the union thwarted him
in violation of its duty of fair representation.
V. CONCLUSION
In the interests of preserving the union's statutory role as bargaining
representative, the Supreme Court has severely limited the individual's rights
in grievance processing. As a result of the Court's pronouncements in Vaca v.
Sipes, it is possible that a wrongfully discharged employee may be stripped of
his job and left without judicial relief. It is interesting to note that the majority
of the Vaca Court was seemingly unconcerned with these untoward conse-
quences. Only Justice Black expressed alarm: "[This decision] . . . puts an
intolerable burden on employees with meritorious grievances and means they
will 'frequently be left with no remedy."'1 34
GARY H FrINBERG
THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES:
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses" of a business shall be deductible. Personal
expenses1 and capital expenditures2 are clearly not deductible, although the
latter are generally depreciable under section 167 of the Code. Whether a par-
ticular cost item is a business expense rather than a personal or capital expendi-
ture is a frequently litigated question, and is the primary issue in the present
concern over educational expense deductions. Although some courts have
characterized expenses for educational pursuits as personal, 8 other courts
have stated that such expenses are similar to capital expenditures 4 and have
denied deductibility on that ground while refusing to allow capital depreciation
and amortization.
5
134. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 210.
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 262.
2. Id. § 263.
3. E.g., Jack B. Wheatland, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 579 (1964); Daniel Kates, 21
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1396 (1962).
4. E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Richard H. Lampkin, 11 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 576 (1952); James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944).
5. See, e.g., Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Nathaniel
A. Denman, 7 CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 1 7419 (June 26, 1967).
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